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Towards an Upstream Model of Child Abuse
Legislation in Illinois
INTRODUCTION

Eighteen years after its initial clinical definition as "battered

child syndrome" 1 , child abuse and neglect is now widely recognized

as a major social problem. Some form of child abuse and neglect
occurs at least eight hundred thousand times annually in the
United States.2 Moreover, in Illinois, the number of reported cases
of abuse and neglect increases annually.' The effect of child abuse
on society is manifested by the large percentage of violent
criminals and abusive parents who were abused as children. 4 Nationwide, legislation has grown from a few criminal statutes in
1962, to its current status of a mandatory reporting act in each
state.3 In addition, Congress has created a federal agency to deal

1. Kempe, Silverman, Steele, Droegemueller & Silver, The Battered Child Syndrome,
181 J.A.M.A. 17 (1962). "Battered child syndrome" was the first medical term used to describe what later became commonly known as child abuse. Its diagnosis was the result of
observing a consistent pattern of severe broken bone injuries in young children, and discovering that those injuries were caused by intentional acts of the parents. When legislation
was enacted to combat battered child syndrome, the terms "abused child" or "child abuse"
were used to describe the intentional physical injuries caused to children, as well as other
kinds of harm. In this article, "child abuse" will be used in this broad context, to describe
physical abuse (including battered child syndrome), sexual abuse, emotional abuse, and neglect. See notes 39 through 53 supra and accompanying text for a more detailed analysis of
these terms in Illinois. See generally Fraser, A Glance at the Past, A Gaze at the Present,
A Glimpse at the Future: A CriticalAnalysis of the Development of Child Abuse Reporting Statutes, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 641, 645-648 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Fraser, Critical
Analysis].
2. It has been estimated that in one year, 100,000 to 200,000 children are physically
abused; 60,000 to 100,000 are sexually abused; 700,000 to 800,000 are neglected; and 2,000

die from some form of child abuse. D.

BESHAROV,

DRAFT-FEDERAL

ABUSE AND NEGLECT PREVENTION AND TREATMENT PROJECTS xi

STANDARDS FOR CHILD

(1978).

3. ILLINOIS DEPT. OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, 1980 PLAN PHASE
SERVICES DATA REPORT 16 (1979).

I: 1978-80

HUMAN

4. Tanay, Psychiatric Study of Homicide, 125 AM. J. PSYCH. 1252 (1969); Menninger,
Satten, Rosen, & Mayman, Murder Without Apparent Motive: A Study in PersonalityDisorganization, 117 AM. J. PSYCH. 43 (1960). See also Dembitz, Preventing Youth Crime by

Preventing Child Neglect 665 A.B.A.J. 920 (1979). CHILD ABUSE
AND THE COMMUNITY (C.H. Kempe and R.E. Heifer eds. 1978).
5.

EDUCATION COMMISSION OF THE STATES, REPORT

LAWS-1977

18-21 (1978) [hereinafter cited as

No. 106,

AND NEGLECT: THE FAMILY

TRENDS IN CHILD PROTECTION

TRENDS IN CHILD PROTECTION].
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with child abuse and neglect.'
Despite the increased attention given to abuse and neglect, many
of those who work in the child protection field are becoming frustrated with treating only the symptoms of the problem. They find
themselves in the position of the person who saves drowning person after drowning person from a river, but eventually walks away
exhausted, to go upstream to find out who is pushing everyone in
the water." Most legislation in child abuse and neglect does not
help in the upstream trek, because it deals primarily with abuse
after it occurs, attempting to aid the abused children and their
families after the child has been "pushed in the water". Although
there is little dispute as to the need for legislation which deals with
children and families after abuse occurs, such legislation has received criticism on two fronts. First, it has been pointed out that
too few states have passed legislation designed to prevent abuse
before it occurs." On the other hand, numerous critics have found
current legislative approaches to be unconstitutional intrusions on
the rights of family privacy. Thus, efforts at child protection often
walk a thin line between state protection of the child through its
6. This agency is called the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect. In addition,
several private organizations are dedicated solely to problems of child abuse. These organizations include: The National Committee for the Prevention of Child Abuse; The National
Center for the Prevention and Treatment of Child Abuse; Parents Anonymous; and the
American Humane Association.
7. See G. EGAN & M. COWAN, PEOPLE IN SYSTEMS: A MODEL FOR DEVELOPMENT IN THE
HUMAN-SERVICE PROFESSIONS AND EDUCATION

3-4 (1979). The authors term this cycle the

"burned out helper syndrome".
8. See Fraser, A Pragmatic Alternative to Current Legislative Approaches to Child
Abuse, 12 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 103 (1974). Louisiana and California have established state
programs designed at prevention of child abuse. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §46:52 (West, 1978)
and CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 189 et seq. (West, 1978 Cum. Supp.). In addition, the federal government funds a number of projects which are aimed at prevention of abuse through
The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5106 (1979). Informa-

tion on the specific guidelines for such projects is located in

UNITED STATES

CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT GRANTS

NATIONAL

FY 1978 80-87

(1978).
9. See generally Bricker, Summary Removal of Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases:
The Need for Due Process Protection,2 FAM. L. REP. 4037 (1976); McCathren, Accountability in the Child Protection System: A Defense of the Proposed Standards Relating to
Abuse and Neglect, 57 G.B.U.L.R. 707 (1977); Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: A Search for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985 (1975). In addition, as long ago as 1870, an Illinois case challenged the broad grant of power to an agency
to care for children who did not have proper parental care. People ex rel. O'Connell v. Turner, 55 Ill. 280 (1870), provides a scathing attack on the use of parens patriae powers by the
Chicago Reform School. This position was later reversed in County of McLean v. Humphreys, 104 Ill. 378 (1882).
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parens patriaepowers, and denial of the due process rights of parents and children.' 0
Recently, Illinois enacted legislation which substantially revises
the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act. 1 In doing so, Illinois takes a first step towards prevention of abuse and neglect by
increasing emphasis on voluntary services. 2 This article will analyze both the amendments to the Reporting Act and the sections of
the older Reporting Act that are still in force. It will examine the
strengths and weaknesses of the Reporting Act as a whole, and
make recommendations for improving it. Finally, by recommending preventive measures, this article will present an upstream
model of child abuse legislation.
THE ILLINOIS ABUSED AND NEGLECTED CHILD REPORTING ACT'S

Background
Illinois' legislative response to child abuse and neglect began
long before the enactment of Illinois' first mandatory reporting
statute." As early as 1899, the Illinois Family Court Act 5 granted
the Family Court jurisdiction over neglected children. "Neglected
children" was judicially construed to include abandoned and medically uncared for children." However, this act did not specifically
include those who suffered abuse through an intentional infliction
of a physical injury. Following the clinical identification of "battered child syndrome' 7 in the early 1960's, the courts and legislatures recognized the intentional nature of child abuse and re10. Although parens patriae literally means "the father of the state", the phrase actually refers to the state's assumption of the role of a parent to care for a child or incompetent
person in those situations where the child is not properly cared for by his parents. Thomas,
Child Abuse and Neglect: Historical Overview, Legal Matrix, and Social Perspectives, 50
N.C.L.R. 293, 315 (1972). See also the early discussion of parens patriae in People ex rel.
O'Connell v. Turner, 55 Ill.
280, 283-85 (1870), as well as the recent commentary on the
concept in In re Wheat, 68 I1. App. 3d 471, 386 N.E.2d 278 (1979).
11. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, §§ 2052-2061.7 (1979) [hereinafter referred to as to the Act].
12. See, especially, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2052 (1979).
13. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, §§ 2051-2061.7 (1979).
14. One of the earliest legislative responses in Illinois to child neglect was a statute that
provided that fines collected from prosecutions involving cruelty to animals or children
would be used for the support of agencies working in those fields. 1885 Ill.
Laws 200.
15. Provisions for neglected and dependent children have been part of this act since it
went into effect on July 1, 1899. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 23, § 161 (1901).
16. People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill.
618, 104 N.E.2d 769, cert. denied, 344 U.S.
824 (1952). The Wallace court found that an infant girl, whose parents refused to allow an
essential blood transfusion for her, was a neglected child under the Juvenile Court Act.
17. The clinical identification was made by Dr. C. Henry Kempe, supra note 1.
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sponded with an emphasis on criminal prosecution of abusive
adults."8 Although Illinois has initiated criminal prosecutions for
child abuse in the past" and continues to do 80,20 the utility of
consistently invoking criminal sanctions is highly questionable.2 '
A child abuse reporting act is a marked contrast to criminal
abuse legislation. 2 Instead of mandating criminal prosecution for
abuse or neglect of a child, a reporting act seeks to do three things.
First, it attempts to identify those who are abused by requiring
reporting of known and suspected abuse. Next, a reporting act outlines procedures for investigating the reports. Finally, such enactments provide for state intervention to save the abused child from
further injury as well as to assist that child's family."
Once a report of alleged child abuse is submitted,2" an investigation ensues.2 5 If the investigation substantiates the existence of
child abuse, then the abusing adults have two alternatives. They
can either submit to a voluntary treatment plan2 6 or face a court

18. See Paulsen, Legal Framework for Child Protection,66 COLuM. L. REv. 679, 688-92
(1966); Note, Constitutionality of the Illinois Child Abuse Statute, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 765
(1972); Note, Criminal Liability of a Parentfor Omission Causing Death of Child, 21 MD.
L. REv. 262 (1961), for a discussion of these early statutes.
19. Act of March 27, 1874, now codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2368 (1978). One of
the first decisions construing this act was Lyman v. People, 65 Iln. App. 687 (1896).
20 People v. Vandiver, 51 Ill. 2d 525, 283 N.E.2d 681 (1971); People v. Virgin, 60 Inl.
App. 3d 964, 377 N.E.2d 846 (1978). But cf. People v. Parris, 130 Ill. App. 2d 933, 267
N.E.2d 39 (1971) (reversing prison sentence for criminal neglect).
21. The debatable nature of such statutes results from questioning the validity of using
punitive measures in child abuse cases where therapeutic measures may have a greater likelihood of preventing future abuse. See Fraser, A PragmaticAlternative to Current Legislative Approaches to Child Abuse, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 103 (1974) [hereinafter referred to as
Fraser, PragmaticAlternative] and Note, People v. Vandiver, 66 Nw. U.L. REv. 838 (1972).
22. An example of the basic form of a reporting statute is found in one of the first model
reporting acts. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEPT. OF H.E.W., THE ABusED CHLD-PRINCIPLES
AND SUGGESTED LANGUAGE FOR LEGISLATION ON REPORTING OF THE PHYSICALLY ABUSED CHILD,

(1963). However, others have stated that the essential goal of a reporting statute is to mobilize protective services for the child. See Bourne and Newberger, "Family Autonomy" or
"Coercive Intervention?" Ambiguity and Conflict in the Proposed Standards for Child
Abuse and Neglect, 57 B.U.L. REv. 670 (1977). The first Illinois reporting act went into
effect in 1965. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2041 et seq. (1965).
23. See Fraser, Critical Analysis, supra note 1, at 645-648, for a more detailed discussion of the identification, investigation and intervention analysis of reporting statutes.
24. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, §' 2054 (1979). See notes 54 through 60 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of who is required to report instances of child abuse, and under
what conditions reports are required.
25. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 23, §§ 2057-2057.19 and 2058-2058.5 (1979). See also notes 61
through 75 infra and accompanying text for a brief summary of the investigation procedures
mandated by the Act.
26. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, §§ 2058.1 and 2058.2 (1979).
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hearing.27

Only a relatively small percentage of reports made under reporting acts are resolved by court hearings."8 Under the Illinois statutory scheme, court involvement may occur in either a criminal or
Juvenile Court proceeding. Unlike the criminal proceedings which
may lead to conviction and punishment, 9 Juvenile Court proceedings are more closely aligned with the intervention goals of the Reporting Act. 0If a Juvenile Court makes a finding that the minor is
"neglected", it can order specific treatment for the child and his
parents or guardians."1
Contents of the Illinois Reporting Act
Purpose
The purpose section of the Illinois Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act,3 2 like the purpose clauses of other reporting acts, 8
broadly sets out the goals of the Act. The Illinois goals were initially threefold: 1) To protect the best interests of the child; 2) To
prevent further harm to children; and 3) To stabilize home envi27. Id. at §§ 2058.2 and 2058.3.
28. Mr. Brian Fraser, executive director of the National Committee for the Prevention of
Child Abuse estimates that approximately 20% of the reports of abuse nationwide are resolved in court adjudications. Interview with Brian Fraser in Chicago (October 18, 1979).
See notes 61 through 71 infra and accompanying text for a description of the Illinois procedures which may result in avoiding court involvement in resolving instances of possible
abuse.
29. See notes 18 through 21 supra and accompanying text. Such criminal prosecutions
may be initiated under various "cruelty to children" statutes. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
23, § 2368 (1979), as well as various sexual abuse provisions found in the Illinois Criminal
Code, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-1 et seq. (1979).
30. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-4 (1979). The Juvenile Court Act definition of neglect is quite broad and encompasses the definitions of "abused child" and "neglected child"
as set forth in the Reporting Act. Id. at ch. 23, § 2053 (1979).
31. Although the Juvenile Court finding of neglect is not criminal in nature, it does allow
the court to order a child removed from his or her home, or to require a specific treatment
plan if the child is allowed to remain in the home. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-1 et seq.
(1979).
32. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2051 et seq. (1979). The contents of the Reporting Act are
designed to meet the guidelines of the Federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act
of 1974. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-06 (1979). This act provides for federal funding of state child
abuse prevention and treatment programs if ten enumerated conditions are met. The federal
government provides approximately fifty-two percent of the Illinois funding for child abuse
and neglect programs. ILLINOIS DEPT. OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, 1978-80 PLAN FOR
CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES (1978).

33. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-5.5-3-1 (Burns, 1979 Cum. Supp.); CONN. GEN. STAT.
17-38a (1979 Cum. Supp.). Other states, such as Missouri, do not have a purpose clause.

§

256
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ronment and preserve family life whenever possible.3"
Although few would argue with the propriety of these goals, they
may be virtually unattainable.3 6 Specifically, the goals of the purpose section point to the inherent conflict in child abuse and neglect cases. For often, when the state intervenes to prevent further
harm to the child, its actions disrupt the home environment it ideally seeks to preserve. Moreover, removal of the child from the
home seems directly contrary to the preservation of family life."
In revising the purpose clause, the legislature added a fourth
goal to the Reporting Act: the reporting of institutional abuse of
state wards.37 Although this addition does focus much needed attention on problems of institutional abuse, it probably does not
expand the actual scope of the Act. As under the previous statute, 8 reporters must report abuse of any child reasonably believed
to have been abused, regardless of the nature of the institution
where the abuse occurred.
Definitions
In order to effectuate the legislative intent behind the Act, it is
necessary that the persons who are responsible to report fully un34. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2052 (1979). A second important modification related to the
purpose of the Reporting Act points out the new Act's aim of emphasizing voluntary services. This addition states that any person may use the services provided by the Act regardless of whether abuse or neglect has occurred. However, the regulations of the Department
of Children and Family Services severely limit the situations in which the Department will

provide for voluntary services. See

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, REGULA-

No. 2.16 (Voluntary Agreement Temporary Custody of Children) (1976).
35. Compare the Illinois goals with the more generalized and realistic goals of the Indiana statute, which provides:
It is the purpose of this chapter to encourage effective reporting of suspected or
known incidents of child abuse or neglect, to provide in each county an effective
child protection service to quickly investigate reports of child abuse or neglect, to
provide protection for a child or children from further abuse or neglect, and to
provide rehabilitative services for the child, or children and the parents involved.
TION

IND. CODE ANN.

§ 31-5.5-3-1 (Burns, 1979 Cum. Supp.).

36. Recently, an Illinois case recognized this conflict when it stated, "[Ijt is clear that
the parent's right to custody will not prevail when the court determines it is contrary to the
best interest of the child." In re Weinstein, 68 Ill. App. 3d 883, 887, 386 N.E.2d 593, 596
(1979). See also In re Wheat, 68 Ill. App. 3d 471, 476, 386 N.E.2d 278 (1979).
37. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2052 (1979). This attention to institutional abuse may have
been initiated by increased local and national attention to institutional abuse. See Chicago

Sun-Times, Sept. 10, 1979, at 3, col. 1. See generally UNrrED

STATES NATIONAL CENTER ON

CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT IN RESIDENTIAL INSTITUTIONS
ILLINOIS DEPT. OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES REGULATION 2.15 (1975) provides

porting and investigating cases of abuse in IDCFS institutions.
38. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2054 (1975).

(1978).
for re-
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derstand what situations constitute abuse and neglect. Thus, the
definitional section, important in all legislative enactments, takes
on added significance in a reporting act.
1. Abused Child

9

In the past, "abuse" was defined as non-accidental "physical injury, sexual abuse or mental injury.'

40

Although these three ele-

ments are included in the new Act, each appears in substantially
altered form. Generally, "abused child" is now specifically defined
to include "serious physical injury; death; disfigurement; impairment of physical.

. .

or emotional health; or loss or impairment of

any bodily function," which is non-accidental, and inflicted by a
person responsible for the child's welfare."' The statute's use of
"impairment of

. .

. emotional health"'

to replace "mental in-

jury ' 's is one important clarification made by the new Act. Unlike
"mental injury", which left unclear the question of whether some
physical manifestation of injury was required in cases of mental
abuse, the new terminology seems to indicate that no physical injury is necessary to constitute a reportable case of emotional
abuse."'
Perhaps the most significant redefinition concerns sexual abuse.
The new Act simply defines sexual abuse as the commission or allowing the commission of "a sex offense against such child, as defined in the Criminal Code of 1961." 4 Thus, Illinois follows the
recent trend set by other states' 6 in more sharply delineating sex39.

"Child", under the Act, is defined as a person under the age of 18 years. ILL. REV.
ch. 23, § 2053 (1979).
40. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2053 (1975).
41. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2053 (1979).
42. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2053 (1979).
43. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2053 (1979).
44. Mental injury and emotional abuse have been called "the most intangible of all the
elements that compose the definition of child abuse." Fraser, Critical Analysis, supra note
1, at 655. A recurring question is whether a physical consequence is required to establish
existence of mental or emotional abuse or injury. As an example of the difficulties in this
area, the participants in a national workshop on emotional abuse were unable to agree on a
specific definition of emotional abuse. Lourie, On Defining Emotional Abuse: Results of an
NIMH/NCCAN Workshop on Child Abuse and Neglect, in NATIONAL CENTER ON CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT, ISSUES ON INNOVATION AND IMPLEMENTATION 199-208 (1978).
STAT.

45. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2053 (1979). Among the crimes referred to are: rape, id. at
ch. 38, § 11-1; indecent liberties with a child, id. at § 11-4; contributing to the sexual delinquency of a child, id. at § 11-5; and incest, id. at § 11-11 (1979). One estimate states that
10% of all child abuse is sexual abuse. B. ScHMrrr, THE CHILD PROTECTION TEAM HAmBOOK, 1 (1979). See also G. MAY, UNDERSTANDING SEXUAL CHILD ABUSE (1977).
46. The current listing of states which define sexual abuse includes: IND. CODE ANN. §
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ual abuse. "
2. Neglected Child
Although the new definition of a "neglected child" 8 is quite similar to the former definition of "neglect '", it makes one significant
change. The new definition does not specifically define "neglected
child" as one who is in an environment injurious to his welfare."
This language, which is still retained by the Juvenile Court Act,51
was deliberately omitted from the Reporting Act and it underscores, perhaps mistakenly, the difference between the two legislative enactments.52 The inclusion of the "environment injurious"
31-5.5-1-1 (Burns, 1978); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.68(2)(b) (West Supp. 1978); MD. CODE ANN.
art. 27 § 35A(b)(8) (Cum. Supp. 1978); MINN. STAT. § 626.556 (Cum. Supp. 1979); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 200.5011(3)(1977); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 371 (4-b)(iii) (McKinney, 1978-79); Omo
REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.031(A) (Page, 1978); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 845 (Supp. 1978-79); S.C.
CODE § 20-10-20 (c)(2) (Supp. 1978); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 48.981 (West Cum. Supp. 1979);
Wvo. STAT. § 14-2-113 (1978).
47. In contrast to this clarity, two other new definitions of abuse are not exceptionally
clear in their scope or purpose. One section includes the commission of "torture" in the
definition of "abused child". While it is clear that no one wants to see a child tortured, it
seems that any kind of torture inflicted on a child is included in the other definitions of an
"abused child". Similarly, another definition of abuse as "excessive corporal punishment"
would certainly appear to be included in the various definitions of "serious physical injury
." or "impairment of physical or emotional health". ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2053 (1979).
48. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2053 (1979).
49. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2053 (1975).
50. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2053 (1979).
51. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 701 et seq. (1979). The Juvenile Court Act has no specific
provision defining an abused child. However, the breadth of the "environment injurious"
language includes the definitions for abused and neglected children in the Reporting Act.
Neglect, under the Juvenile Court Act, has been construed quite broadly as "failure to exercise the care that the circumstances justly demand ....
It is not a term of fixed and measured meaning." People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Il. 618, 624, 104 N.E.2d 769, cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 161 (1952). See also In re Stilley, 66 Il. 2d 515, 363 N.E.2d 820 (1977); In
re Ross, 29 II. App. 3d 157, 329 N.E.2d 333 (1975).
52. Retention of the language in the Juvenile Court Act maintains the broad jurisdictional base which the Act confers on the Juvenile Court. In contrast, the Reporting Act
concerns the identification and reporting of suspected instances of child abuse and neglect
and, thus, requires very specific standards. Although People v. Schoos, 15 M1L
App. 3d 964,
305 N.E.2d 560, appeal dismissed, 417 U.S. 963 (1973), held that this broad jurisdictional
grant was constitutional, the breadth of the Juvenile Court definition has serious problems.
First, the definition grants jurisdiction to the Juvenile Court predicated solely on a concluory allegation that a minor's environment may be injurious. Second, the broad definition
allows courts to make findings of neglect on factual situations that are quite different from
the allegations in the original neglect petition. See People v. Schoos, supra at 966. Finally,
the current definition gives parents and children little notice of the reasons the child is
believed to be neglected.
Standards proposed by the Institute of Judicial Administration and American Bar Association Joint ConAmittee on Juvenile Justice Standards would greatly improve the Juvenile
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language in the previous reporting legislation was unnecessarily
broad and confusing. Furthermore, the legislature's omission of the
phrase should focus attention on the distinction between abuse
and neglect. By omitting the "environment injurious" language,
the new Act emphasizes that neglect, the deprivation of the necessities of life, can occur without any resulting physical, emotional,
or sexual injury. 3
Persons Required to Report
Central to any reporting statute is the legislative determination
of the particular persons who are mandated to report child abuse
and neglect. Accordingly, the Act continues to require reporting
from medical, law enforcement, and school personnel, as well as
social workers." In addition, the Act imposes the reporting obligation on personnel from particular Illinois agencies. 5 Surprisingly,
the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (IDCFS),
which is mandated to investigate and treat reported child abuse, is
not listed among these agencies. Although a substantial number of
IDCFS personnel might be required to report as social, foster, or
child care workers, the failure to specifically name IDCFS as a
mandated reporter detracts from the clarity of the Act and seems
contrary to the purpose of a reporting act." Moreover, in light of
the new Act's concern for institutional abuse57 and of the IDCFS
workers' unique responsibility to investigate abuse within state institutions, inclusion of the agency would seem imperative.
Court definition of neglect. They define several categories of abuse and neglect (physical,
sexual, emotional, medical) and require a juvenile court neglect petition to state the category under which jurisdiction is alleged. At the actual hearing, the State would have to
present facts supporting such allegations. See Synopsis: Standards Relating to Abuse and
Neglect, 57 B.U.L. REV. 663-664 (1977).
53. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2053 (1979).
54. In addition, all other people are permitted to report if they, like the mandated reporters, have reasonable cause to believe a child is abused or neglected. ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
23, § 2054 (1979). It has been suggested that the phrase "reasonable cause to believe" implies objective criteria for reporting. It would thus require reporting whenever the potential
reporter knows of circumstances that would give a reasonable man the belief that a given
child has been abused or neglected. See Sussman, Reporting Child Abuse: A Review of the
Literature, 8 FAM. L.Q. 245 (1974), for further discussions of the reporter's state of mind.
55. Field personnel of the Departments of Public Aid, Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities, Corrections, and Public Health, as well as probation officers and child care
workers are now required to report. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2054 (1979).
56. Nor does the claim that IDCFS workers are social, foster, or child care workers explain why other agencies, whose personnel could also be thus included, were specifically
named in the Act.
57. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2052 (1979).
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A second modification clarifies the circumstances under which
reporters must report. The new Act requires reports of "a child
known to [mandated reporters] in their professional or official capacity ...

."5 Consequently, when a person who is ordinarily re-

sponsible to report acts outside of her professional role, the
mandatory reporting obligation does not apply. Of course, this individual may, like all other persons, choose to voluntarily report."
Certainly, the distinction between professional and private roles
will not always be apparent. However, the new provisions clearly
limit the potential liability for failure to report."
Reporting Procedures
In describing the procedures IDCFS must follow in responding
to an initial report of abuse or neglect, the legislature has provided
a detailed outline of the agency's responsibilities." Essential to
carrying out the IDCFS statutory mandate is the Child Protective
Services Unit (CPSU).62 The CPSU receives information concerning oral reports and mandatory written, follow-up reports." In
emergencies, the CPSU must investigate reports immediately,
while in all other cases they must initiate their investigation within
twenty-four hours of the initial report." If the investigating person
&annot get access to the child who is the subject of the initial report, a court or law enforcement agency can intervene. 6 5 After investigating, the CPSU must determine whether the case is unfounded or indicated. 6a Even in situations in which the CPSU
decides to close a case as unfounded, the Act allows that unit to
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2054 (1979).
59. Id.
60. See Isaacson, Child Abuse Reporting Statutes: The Case for Holding Physicians
Civilly Liable for Failing to Report, 12 SAN DIGO L. REV. 743 (1975). A number of states
have created civil and or criminal liability for failure to report. See TRENDS IN CHILD PRO-

58.

TECTION,

supra note 5, at 18-21.

61. As evidence of the greater detail, the new Act describes in 26 sections what had
previously been outlined in two. Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, §§ 2057-2057.19 and 20582058.5 (1979) with ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, §§ 2057 and 2058 (1975).
62. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2053 (1979). This section should be read in conjunction with
the description of the CPSU's functions. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2057 et seq. (1979).
63. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2057, 2057.6 (1979).
64. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2057.4 (1979). This section also provides that the investigation shall include an evaluation of the child's environment, a determination of the risk to
the child by remaining in that environment, a specific investigation of conditions given in
the original report to IDCFS, and an examination of other children in the home.
65. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2057.5 (1979).
66. Id. at § 2057.12. See note 99 infra for the definitions of unfounded, undetermined,
and indicated.
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offer social services to the child or family.67
When the CPSU determines that probable cause of abuse or
neglect exists, it is required to develop an appropriate service plan
for the family's voluntary acceptance or refusal.18 The CPSU is
also required to explain both its lack of legal authority to compel
compliance with a plan, and its concomitant power to file a neglect
petition in Juvenile Court.6 9 In addition, the CPSU may assist the
court if a petition is filed in neglect proceedings under the Juvenile
Court Act.70 Finally, any rehabilitation or treatment that the family and child participate in, whether voluntary or court-ordered, is
to be monitored by the CPSU.71
By emphasizing the use of a unit instead of an individual social
worker, the CPSU appears to resemble what other states have

called Multi-disciplinary Child Protection Teams. 7 ' The two con67.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2058.1 (1979).
68. Id. This section, when read in conjunction with the goals of the Act, may lead to the
institution of actions against IDCFS by those who are not offered the voluntary services the
Act mandates. Such actions, generally named "right to treatment suits" have been used
previously in situations involving individuals committed to both mental health and juvenile
detention facilities. Actions in the latter category have been based on the proposition that
since the goal of the juvenile court system, as parens patriae,is rehabilitation and not punishment, those juveniles who are detained have a right to rehabilitation. Nelson v. Heyne,
491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974). See also Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53, 70-71 (E.D. Tex.
1974), rev'd on other grounds, 535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 430 U.S. 322 (1976), on
remand, 562 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1978) (finding a right to treatment based on due process
rights and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, as well as a statutory right to treatment based on the purpose section of the Texas Juvenile Court Act). In addition, see Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hospital, 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1975), which
found that a right to treatment existed in situations involving mental health commitments.
A right to treatment suit against IDCFS would most likely be filed by someone who either
requested treatment from IDCFS, or one who was never offered voluntary services by
IDCFS prior to a court action involving child abuse or neglect. Either situation appears to
violate the clear intentions of the Act. ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 23, §§ 2052.1, 2058.2 (1979). See
generally Note, Rights and Obligations of Involuntary Committed Individuals,87 HAnv. L.
REV. 1316 (1974).
69. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2058.2 (1979). See also Levine, Caveat Parens:A Demystification of the Child Protection System, 35 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1, 29 (1973), which discusses the
giving of Miranda warnings to parents involved in the child protection system.
70. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2058.2 (1979). This can apparently be done by the CPSU
itself or by the local State's Attorney or law enforcement agency.
71. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, §§ 2058.3 and 2058.4 (1979).
72. Child Protection Teams are currently part of the reporting acts of eleven states. CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 18951(d) (West Cum. Supp. 1978); COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-10-109
(Cum. Supp. 1977); IND. CODE ANN. 31-5.5-3-14 (Burns 1978 Cum. Supp.); MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 119 § 51D (West Cum. Supp. 1979); MICH. CoMP. LAws § 722.629(1) (Cure. Supp.
1979); PA. STAT. ANN. ch. 11 § 2216(d)(Purdon Cum. Supp. 1979); S.C. CODE § 20-10110(D)(Cum. Supp. 1978); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1207 (1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3b-8(4)
(1979); VA. CODE § 63.1-248.6 (Cum. Supp. 1979); WYo. STAT. § 14-2-123 (1978).
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cepts, however, are quite different in form and function. Unlike the
CPSU, which is made up entirely of IDCFS personnel,7 a multidisciplinary team is made up of experts from such diverse fields as
law, psychology, medicine, and child development. In addition, in
some states, the multi-disciplinary team is distinct from the investigatory agency and it reviews that agency's actions before deciding
whether to recommend filing of a petition to initiate a judicial
hearing.7 ' In contrast, the CPSU both investigates and makes its
own decision of whether court action is necessary. Regrettably, the
Illinois approach avoids the obvious benefits of a team of experts
and, at the same time, provides no objective check on IDCFS's decision to seek judicial involvement in individual cases. 75
Temporary Protective Custody
One of the most controversial aspects of child abuse and neglect
legislation is the concept of temporary protective custody. Although the indisputable objective of temporary protective custody
is to take the child out of imminent danger and provide immediate, necessary care, 7 certain genuine questions about this practice
remain. One such concern has been the placement of children after
temporary protective custody is taken.7 The new Act responds by
In several states these teams are merely advisory boards with little or no decision making
powers. They are designed to provide expertise in psychiatry, law, medicine, and social work
to those people who investigate reports of abuse and neglect. Other states, while maintaining the use of experts from several fields, mandate that the team investigate all reports of
abuse in its geographic area, arrange for protective services for the child, and file petitions
in court on behalf of the abused child. See generally Fraser, Critical Analysis, supra note 1,
at 675-677.
73. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2053 (1979).
74. In Colorado, representatives of the community (minorities and lay persons) serve on
the team to help determine what a given community considers neglect or abuse. COLO. REV.
STAT. § 19-10-109(9)-(10) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
75. One of the fairly consistent problems faced by IDCFS is the negative publicity directed at the agency when children who are left in the custody of parents under investigation suffer serious injury. To avoid such criticism, IDCFS may use the Juvenile Court more
often to make decisions concerning return to the original home, instead of making those
decisions itself. A Child Protection Team also could diffuse criticism directed at IDCFS by
making the final decision as to whether to recommend prosecution. IDCFS could thus return to its goals of treating the child and family as outlined in ILL. REV. STAT. ch: 23, § 2052
(1979).
76. Fraser, Critical Analysis, supra note 1, at 675.
77. Under the prior statute, if temporary protective custody was taken by a hospital
doctor, the child could be temporarily retained at the hospital. In other situations, temporary custody could be maintained in a foster home, an IDCFS shelter care facility, or a
temporary detention center (such as the Audy Home in Chicago). ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §§
703-1 to 703-8 (1978).
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allowing only certain kinds of institutional custody.7" A more fundamental question concerns the precise nature of the circumstances which justify removal of the child from the home without
violation of the parents' due process rightss Unfortunately this
question is left unaddressed in the Act. 0
The Act permits IDCFS personnel and physicians to take protective custody of the child s ' providing three specific conditions
are met.82 However, unlike the Juvenile Court Act provisions,83 the
new Act fails to state the maximum period a child may be kept in
temporary custody without a hearing or notice to parents." The

78. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2053 (1979). This revision does not allow temporary protective custody to be maintained at the places for "detention of criminal or juvenile offenders"
(e.g., the Audy Home). A similar revision in the Juvenile Court Act provides for the same
result. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 703-6 (1979).
79. Where standards for taking temporary protective custody were overly broad, they
were found to violate procedural due process under the fourteenth amendment by impinging
on a fundamental right of family integrity. Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769, 777-78 (M.D. Ala.
1976). But see Sims v. State Dept. of Public Welfare, 438 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D. Texas, 1978),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Moore v. Sims, - U.S. -, 99 S.Ct. 2371 (1979). The Sims
decision found that the Texas temporary protective custody procedure, which failed to provide for an adversary hearing after the child was removed from his parents' home, was constitutionally infirm. However, the court held the language of the temporary protective custody statute itself was constitutionally adequate. 438 F. Supp. 1179, 1192-94. See generally
Bricker, Summary Removal of Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases: The Need for Due
Process Protection, 2 FAM. L. REP. 4037 (1976); Levine, supra note 69, at 29.
80. Recommendations for remedying this deficiency are discussed at notes 108 through
113 infra and accompanying text.
81. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2055 (1979). This section of the Reporting Act should be
read in conjunction with the temporary protective custody sections of the Juvenile Court
Act. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 703-1 to 703-8 (1979). Only police officers are allowed to take
such custody under the Juvenile Court Act. The previous reporting act specifically named
only doctors as individuals who could take such custody. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2055
(1975).
82. Those persons whom the Reporting Act allows to take temporary protective custody,
may do so only if the following conditions are met: 1) The person acting has reason to
believe that the child's current circumstances present an "imminent danger to that child's
life or health." 2) The responsible adult is unable, or does not consent to the removal of the
child from his or her custody. 3) No time exists to apply for a court order for temporary
custody under the Juvenile Court Act. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2055 (1979). The stating of
these explicit conditions is the major change in the new Act's approach to temporary protective custody.
83. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 703-5 (1979), requires that "a minor taken into protective
custody must be brought before a judicial officer within 48 hours, exclusive of Sundays and
legal holidays." If the minor is not so treated, he or she must be released. Id. One reason for
the exclusion of a time limit from the Act might be an unstated assumption that once custody is taken the Juvenile Court Act's temporary custody provisions control.
84. Reasonable effort to notify the persons responsible for the child's welfare is all that
is required. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 23, § 2055 (1979). See MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, §
51B(3) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) arid N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 417 (McKinney, 1979) for two
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severity of the state intrusion in temporary protective custody requires a legislative pronouncement giving the child and parents the
5
procedural protections ensured by the Juvenile Court Act.1

Photographs and X-Rays
Illinois remains one of twenty states which provide for the taking of photographs and x-rays in child abuse investigations. 6 The
Illinois Act allows those people investigating cases of suspected
abuse to "take . . . color photographs and x-rays of the area of
trauma on the child who is the subject of a report."87 This brief
section provides an invaluable tool for proving abuse or neglect in
court hearings.8 X-rays or photographs, when accompanied by expert medical testimony, can establish that certain injuries sustained by a child could have been caused only by abusive acts.8
The Act ensures immunity from prosecution for those who take
the photographs and x-rays. 0 The only modification made by the
amendments requires the person taking the x-rays or photographs
to attempt to notify the child's parents of the action taken.91
Abrogation of Privileged Communications
The abrogation of privileged communication in reports and court
adjudications concerning child abuse and neglect is one of the
variations which do place limits on emergency custody.
85. See note 83 supra.
86. See, TRENDS IN CHILD PROTECTION, supra note 5 for a listing of the other states.
87. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2056 (1975).
88. See generally Ryan, MINS, Neglected and Dependent Children, Child Abuse and
Termination of Parental Rights, ILLINOIS JUVENILE LAW AND PRACTICE 8-44 (Ill.
Inst. for
Continuing Legal Education, 1977).
In Illinois, color slides of a dead infant showing numerous bruises have been found admissible in neglect hearings. People v. Brown, 83 Ill. App. 2d 411, 228 N.E.2d 495 (1967). See
also In re Brooks, 63 Ill. App. 3d 328, 379 N.E.2d 872 (1978).
89. Certain kinds of burns and bone fractures are especially recurrent in cases of child
abuse. See B. SCHMITT, THE CHILD PROTECTION TEAM HANDBOOK 43 (1978); Brown, Fox and
Hubbard, Medical and Legal Aspects of the Battered Child Syndrome, 50 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 45, 71-75 (1974). One such injury apparently was involved in In re Christenberry, 69
Ill. App. 3d 565, 387 N.E.2d 923 (1979), where a medical expert testified concerning the
skull fracture suffered by an infant.
90. In addition, the Act provides immunity for all persons who in good faith participte in
investigations of children that may be neglected or abused. The immunity extends also to
those who report instances of neglect or abuse under the Act. To further this purpose, the
Illinois statute creates a presumption of good faith for all reports made under the Act. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2059 (1979).
91. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2056 (1979). Actually, the statute refers not only to parents,
but to those persons responsible for the child's welfare,
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unique aspects of legislation in this field.9 2 The previous Reporting
Act revoked the privileges only in judicial proceedings,"3 but the

recent revisions expand abrogation to all situations in which reporting is required.94 Despite this expansion, some ambiguity persists. For example, although other states expressly retain the attorney-client privilege, 95 Illinois fails to specify whether this privilege
remains intact under the Reporting Act. However, several factors
indicate that the attorney-client privilege has been retained. First,
the Act abrogates privileges only as to those people who are re-

quired to report or who actually report, and to those individuals
who investigate reports under the Act." An attorney does not fit
any of these categories. Second, allowing an attorney to testify concerning the child abuse admissions of a client could undermine one
of the general goals of the judicial system-confidence in one's attorney. 97 Notwithstanding these factors, a clearer statement explicitly retaining the attorney-client privilege is necessary."s
Central Register
The Act establishes a central register which serves as a reposi92. Such provisions state that a professional who is normally prohibited from divulging
information given to her by a client is not bound by such a requirement when the communication concerns child abuse. See generally Burke, Evidentiary Problems of Proof in Child
Abuse Cases: Why Family and Juvenile Courts Fail, 13 J. FAN. L. 819 (1974); Note, Evidence Privileges:Husband and Wife-Exception for Offenses Against the Spouse Applies
to Crimes Against the Child of Either Spouse, 45 U. CINN. L. REV. 304 (1976).
93. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2060 (1975). This provision states that in any judicial proceeding resulting from a child abuse or neglect report, "[n]o evidence shall be excluded by
reason of any common law or statutory privilege relating to communications between the
alleged perpatrator of abuse or neglect, or the child subject of the report under this Act and
the person making or investigating the report." See also ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 51, § 51.7 (7)
(1979), which allows physicians to violate their physician-patient privilege in child abuse
adjudications.
94. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2054 (1979) provides: "The privileged quality of communication between any professional person required to report and his patient or client shall not
apply to situations involving abused or neglected children and shall not constitute grounds
for failure to report as required by this act."
95. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.631 (Cum. Supp. 1979); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §199.337(7)
(Baldwin Cum. Supp. 1978). Forty-five states, including Illinois, provide for the abrogation
of some privilege or privileges in child abuse and neglect prosecutions. In general, since
privileges are usually statutorily created, little problem exists in abrogating them. However,
the extent of abrogation varies from state to state. While some states abrogate specific privileges, others abrogate all privileges except attorney-client. See generally TRENDS IN CHILD
PROTECTION,

96.

supra note 5, at 18-21.

See notes 92 through 94 supra.
97. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RsPsorismLrrY, Canon 4 provides: "A lawyer should
preserve the confidences and secrets of a client."
98. Examples of such clarity are found in the statutes listed in note 95 supra.
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tory for all reports made under the Act." Such reports are transmitted to the central register by the CPSU.10 0 Maintaining a register of all reports allows IDCFS to notify CPSU units of previous
reports of abuse or neglect involving the same child.10 1 The register, however, releases no information unless it comes from an "indicated" report of abuse or neglect.10 ' The determination of
whether a report is "indicated" is made by the CPSU.
Some measure of procedural protection must be accorded to persons named in reports and the Act embodies three such measures.
First, the subject of any report can request expungement of identifying information from the register. If the request is denied, the
person has a right to a hearing at which IDCFS will have the burden to prove the accuracy of the report.1 02 The second procedural
protection requires the subject's notification each time a record

99. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, §§ 2058, 2061 (1979). The modifications in this section appear
to have been influenced by the following groups of sources: (1) Suggestions by model legislation and authors in the child abuse field: EDUCATION COMMISSION OF THE STATES, MODEL
LEGISLATION FOR THE STATES REPORT No. 71 47-51 (1976); Besharov, Putting Central Registers to Work: Using Modern Management Information Systems to Improve Child Protective Services, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 687 (1978); Fraser, Toward a More Practical Central
Registry, 51 DEN. L.J. 509 (1974); (2) States which have revised their central registry: COLO.
REV. STAT. § 19-10-103 (11) (Cum. Supp. 1977); (3) Court challenges to current registry
procedures: Sims v. State Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 438 F. Supp. 1179, 1192 (S.D. Texas 1978),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Moore v. Sims, - U.S. -, 99 S.Ct. 2371 (1979).
In addition, four new definitions are essential to the central registry section. An "unfounded report is one which has no credible evidence to verify it." A report which is supported by credible evidence is an "indicated report." An "undetermined report" is one
which was never completed because of insufficient information. Finally, "the subject of a
report" refers to the child and responsible adult named in a report which is later sent to the
central register. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2053 (1979).
100. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2057.9 (1979). Among the ways the new Act differs from
the previous statute is the enunciation of explicit goals for the central register. The new Act
states:
Through the recording of. . . reports, the central register shall be operated...
to enable the Department to: (1) immediately identify and locate prior reports or
cases of child abuse or neglect; (2) continuously monitor the current status of all
cases of child abuse or neglect. . . and (3) regularly evaluate the effectiveness of
existing laws and programs ....
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2057.7 (1979).
101. Id. at § 2057.8.
102. Id. Although the statute's use of "whether" appears ambiguous, it is fairly clear
from other sections that the new Act foresees that no unfounded report will be released.
The statute provides that all "information identifying the subjects of an unfounded report
shall be expunged from the record forthwith." Id. In addition, all records shall be removed
from the register within five years after the last report involving someone named in that
report. Id. at § 2057.14.
103. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2057.16 (1979). However, a previous court finding of neglect
is presumptive evidence that the report was not unfounded. Id.
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naming that person is amended, expunged or removed. ' " Finally,
the Act attempts to ensure confidentiality by making the unauthorized release of records a criminal offense.10 5
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT
LEGISLATION

Illinois' statutory response to child abuse and neglect, although
relatively comprehensive in scope, is alone insufficient to curb the

continuing problems of abuse and neglect. Efforts must be directed
to the prevention of abuse before it occurs. Thus, action must be
taken which is entirely outside the scope of the new Act. Moreover,
the Act should be improved by clarifying the definitional section
and the key concepts embodied by the Act. ' " Progressive measures
already used in other states should also be incorporated.
Clarificationof Key Terms
The concept of temporary protective custody, embodied in the
Act, 10 7 must be modified to better protect the legitimate interests
of the parent and child. The summary removal involved in such

104. Id. at § 2057.17. In addition, a subject of a report, with some reservations, is entitled to receive a copy of all information concerning him or her, which is located in the
central register. Id.
One other use of the central register is clear from the provisions of the new Act, its value
in aiding research. Although such a use is not specifically mentioned, statistics from the
register would appear to be of use in the education and training program established by the
new Act. In establishing a goal of informing the general public of various aspects of child
abuse and neglect, Illinois joins 13 other states that also have established education and
training as part of their reporting statute. The amount of funding such a program will receive is unclear. Equally vague is the role of the "State-wide Citizen's Committee on Child
Abuse and Neglect." Created to consult with and advise the Director of IDCFS, that Committee has a broad spectrum of information to gather, but no statutory power to implement
any programs. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, §§ 2061.5 and 2061.7 (1979). See generally TRENDS IN
CHILD PROTECTION, supra note 5, at 18-21.
105. Breach of confidentiality is a Class A Misdemeanor. ILL. Rzv. STAT. ch. 23, § 2061
(1979). However, the Act allows certain listed people to have access to the records. Id. at §
2061.1.
106. As noted above, one of the first changes in a reporting act revision in Illinois should
be a removal or refining of unclear definitions. See discussion in note 47 supra and accompanying text. A second modification should be the addition of IDCFS workers to the list of
mandatory reporters. Although such personnel may already be included in the broader categories in the Act, specific mention of IDCFS workers, like the listing of workers from other
state agencies, would focus attention on the fact that such workers have a high frequency of
contact with abused and neglected children. The absence of any mention of IDCFS personnel is also contrary to the Act's purpose of preventing institutional abuse. See notes 55 and
56 supra and accompanying text.
107. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2053 (1979).
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custody demands a sensitive balancing of interests. The danger of
the child remaining with possibly abusive parents must be weighed
against the right of parents to choose how to raise their own children. One commentator has recommended that temporary protective custody be permitted only upon a showing that a child has
been subjected to such serious and imminent danger that irremediable harm is likely to result to the child. 10 8 The current Illinois
standard of "imminent danger to that child's life or health", 10 9 although superficially similar in meaning, is unnecessarily broader
than the suggested standard." 0 For example, the Illinois standard
authorizes summary removal when a social service worker determines that a child is subject to imminent danger."' Since custody
decisions may often be influenced by cultural biases, 112 the likelihood for improper summary removal increases under Illinois'
broad standard."13 In contrast, the irremediable harm standard
would mandate a more studied approach by those removing a child
from her home. Finally, the Reporting Act, like the Juvenile Court
Act, 1 4 should not allow any child to be held in custody for more
than forty-eight hours unless a judicial determination is made to
determine that custody should continue." 5
. 108. Bricker, supra note 79, recommends that "[p]re-hearing removals be allowed only
when a child has been subjected to a serious and imminent danger of such severity that the
provision of a prior judicial hearing would be likely to result in irremediable harm to the
child's life or health." 2 FAM. L. REP. 4037, 4039.
109. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2055 (1979).
110. A constitutional objection, based on state intrusion on a right of family integrity,
may also exist. In Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769, 777 (M.D. Ala. 1976), the court held that
Alabama's temporary protective custody statute was unconstitutionally vague. See also Alsager v. District Court of Polk County, Iowa, 406 F. Supp. 10 (S.D. Iowa 1975).
111. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2055 (1979).
112. See Paulsen, Juvenile Courts, Family Courts and the Poor Man, 54 CAL. L. REV.
694 (1966). See also S. KATZ, WHEN PARENTS FAIL: THE LAW'S RESPONSE TO FAMILY BREAKDOWNS 26 (1971).
113. In addition, the predictive validity of many decisions to remove children from dangerous home situations is highly questionable. In one study, three highly qualified child
welfare specialists reviewed placement decisions in 50 states involving 90 children. They
individually determined whether each child should have .been removed from his or her parents for treatment. Using over 150 separate informational items in each case, the experts
agreed in less than 50% of the cases. Phillips et al., Factors Associated with Placement
Decisions in Child Welfare, CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA (1971), cited in Bricker,
supra note 79, at 4038.
114. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 703-5 (1979).
115. Without an assurance of a hearing, such custody procedures may be far from temporary. In White v. Minter, 330 F. Supp. 1194, 1196 (D. Mass. 1971), a summary removal
lasted for six months before a hearing occurred. When a temporary custody hearing is
finally held, the standard for the state's retention of custody should again be one of irreme-
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Additions to the Reporting Act

Several additions to the Reporting Act are necessary to facilitate
accomplishment of the legislative aims. First, the Act should explicitly mandate that a guardian ad litem be provided for the child
at the earliest feasible time in the intervention process. Second,
the Act should establish multi-disciplinary child protection teams
which would supplant the CPSU's evaluatory functions. CPSU
units, though, should retain their investigatory authority. The bifurcation of authority involved in this plan would not only provide
an objective check on the critical determinations made by the
CPSU, but it would also ensure the utilization of the expertise necessary in evaluatory determinations." 6
Guardian ad Litem'"
Presently, the Juvenile Court Act provides for the use of a
guardian ad litem in neglect hearings."1 However, this provision
only applies to representation at trial. Because a number of important steps take place before the adjudicatory hearing, the Reporting Act should be modified to ensure that the guardian ad litem
represents the child at all judicial hearings. Such representation
should begin with the initial temporary protective custody hearing.
To fully represent the child, the guardian ad litem must be informed prior to the proceeding, giving him ample time to interview
the child and become familiar with the case background.1 "
Under the Juvenile Court Act, the role of the guardian ad litem

diable harm. This is to be contrasted with one of the current standards for retaining custody, a finding that "[it is a matter of immediate and urgent necessity for the protection of
the minor" to keep the child in custody. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 703-6 (1979).
116. See discussion in notes 72 through 75 supra and accompanying text.
117. See generally Fraser, Independent Representation for the Abused and Neglected
Child: The Guardian ad Litem, 13 CAL. W.L. REV. 16 (1977); Redeker, The Right of an
Abused Child to Independent Counsel and the Role of the Child Advocate in Child Abuse
Cases, 23 VILL. L. REV. 521 (1978).
118. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 704-5 (1979).
119. A proposal requiring at least one face-to-face meeting between the guardian ad litern and the child to be represented was rejected by the Illinois Senate. One ground for such
an objection may have been the belief that a face-to-face meeting would have little effect
when the allegedly abused child is an infant. However, even in such cases, a face-to-face
meeting (possibly in the presence of parents) would give the guardian ad litem a better
awareness of the problems confronting the child.
In addition, the guardian ad litem must continually inform the child-client of what procedures are occurring in the judicial process. Of course, this must be 'done as simply as possible. Such information and consideration would be especially helpful for children who are
separated from their parents and are living in either foster homes or institutions.
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as both the child's attorney and as one responsible for the child's
best interests may create a conflict of interests. As the child's attorney, the guardian ad litem may be impelled to contravene the
child's desires'12 in order to promote the child's best interests in
accordance with the goals of the Juvenile Court Act.-" 1
Thus, when incorporating a guardian ad litem provision in the
Reporting Act, the legislature must anticipate this potential conflict and resolve it appropriately.122 Two alternatives should permit
an orderly resolution of the issue if it develops. The statute could
mandate that in the event the guardian ad litem perceives that the
child's best interests are in conflict with the child's wishes, then
the guardian must inform the court of both his and the child's
opinion. In addition, the guardian should bring any evidence supporting either opinion to the court's attention. Alternatively, the
Reporting Act may provide that in the event of an actual conflict,
the Juvenile Court is authorized
to assign independent counsel to
28
represent the child's wishes.

24
Child Protection Teams1

Implementation of child protection teams to supplement the
statutorily sanctioned CPSU would improve the diagnosis and
treatment of child abuse and neglect cases. This multi-disciplinary
group would include persons with specialized knowledge in diversi120. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 7 which provides, "A lawyer should represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law."
121. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-2 (1979).
122. Obviously, in a number of neglect cases the child is not old enough to decide what
he wants his attorney to do. In such cases, it would be quite appropriate for the guardian ad
litem to be both guardian and attorney. Ideally, however, in cases of older children, the
attorney should represent the wishes of the child-client to the court.
The guardian ad litem, whether an attorney or not, should investigate by looking at all
medical and other reports concerning the case of suspected abuse or neglect. Family members and other potential witnesses should be interviewed. He should check the central register for any previous reports of abuse or neglect involving either the child or the family
involved. Finally, the guardian ad litem should consult with a child development specialist
that is independent of IDCFS and who has examined the family structure and is able to
make recommendations concerning what is best for the child.
123. In addition, the statute should mandate that the guardian ad litem do the following
fdur tasks in each case in which a child is represented: (1) Investigate, to provide the court
with all relevant information. This includes an interview with the child and family. (2) Present all relevant information to the court, including the child's wishes. (3) Insure that the
court has before it all viable dispositions. (4) As a guardian, insure that the child's present
and long range interesti are protected. See Fraser and Martin, An Advocate for the Abused
Child, THE ABUSED CHILD 165 (1976).
124. See generally B. SCHMITT, supra note 89.
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fled fields, thereby
possessing the requisite ability to appraise the
1 25
child's situation.
To ensure that these teams are available in every instance of reported child abuse, the legislature must statutorily establish
them.' 2 1 Further, because the multi-disciplinary teams would function most effectively within the framework of an integrated child
protection system,2 7 they should be legislatively created as part of
the Reporting Act.' 28 Any such legislation should precisely delineate the team's functions and responsibilities. At a minimum, these
functions should include responsibility to thoroughly analyze and
evaluate information gathered by the CPSU. In addition, the
teams should inform all necessary parties of any recommendations
relative to treatment or court involvement. 12 9 Another function of
the team would be establishment of a community plan to help foster other elements of the Reporting Act, such as providing public
education on abuse and neglect.'
Towards an Upstream Model
Since the advent of child abuse legislation, the statutory focus
125. Id. at 9. Currently, several hospitals in Illinois have child protection teams that
diagnose and treat cases of suspected abuse and neglect at the sponsoring hospital. These
hospital teams then report the cases of suspected abuse to IDCFS if a report was not previously made. Such teams have been operating without a legislative act creating them and, in
all probability, will continue to do so.
126. The three most necessary members for such a team are the physician, social worker,
and co-ordinator. In addition, an attorney, a psychologist or child development specialist, or
members of the community in which the team is located may also be quite helpful in consultative roles. See B. SCHMITT, supra note 89, at 10.
One approach would allow IDCFS workers to perform the initial investigation of any report, assessing the immediate environment and taking any emergency measures. The
worker, along with any other significant people involved in the case, could then meet with
the team. The team, after gathering all the relevant data, would recommend a treatment
plan if one was required. If the team decides court action is necessary for the child's protection, they should be allowed to file a neglect petition in the Juvenile Court. When a petition
is filed, the team should immediately contact the guardian ad litem and inform the guardian
of the background of the case. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-103 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
127. See Fraser, Critical Analysis, supra note 1, at 675-677.
128. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-109(9) (CuM. Supp. 1977); VA. CODE § 63.1-248-6(A)
(Cum. Supp. 1979); Wvo. STAT. § 14-2-123 (1978).
129. Such necessary parties would include the responsible adults, the child, the State's
Attorney, the Public Defender, the Guardian ad litem, and IDCFS.
130. See, e.g., the structure of Child Protection Teams in Colorado. CoLo. REV. STAT. §
19-10-103(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
Since the team must work intensively on each case, a large metropolitan area like Chicago
might have a large number of community-based teams. One goal in basing the teams locally
is to ensure that cultural biases are not the primary reasons for the filing of neglect
petitions.
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has concentrated on procedures to be followed after a child has
been abused or neglected. In fact, only a few states have promulgated preventive measures designed to reduce the frequency of
abuse and neglect." s ' Illinois, which has failed to pursue a preventive approach, should place itself at the forefront of child abuse
legislation by enacting the following progressive measures. 18 '
Crisis Nursery
A crisis nursery prevents child abuse by separating the child
from the potentially abusive parents during a time of crisis. Parents may voluntarily leave their children at such a nursery during
times of high emotional or physical stress. At no time are the parents required to explain the reasons for bringing the child, who
may remain at the nursery for a period up to three days. The National Center for the Prevention and Treatment of Child Abuse
1 Staffed
and Neglect has established a similar center in Denver. 38
by a group of volunteers who are supervised by two registered
nurses, the Denver nursery has proven highly successful.as In the
131. Louisiana, for example, has established child protection centers throughout the
state. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:52 (West 1978); See also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 18950 et
seq. (West 1978 Cum. Supp.).

132. Several presumptions preface this section. First, parents who abuse and neglect
children usually had similar experiences of poor parenting themselves, and/or are unprepared for parenting in their adult lives. They often have low frustration levels and overly
high expectations of their children. In addition, much abuse occurs in the time following a
crisis in the abusing parent's life. Finally, and most importantly, the major breakdowns in
parent-child relationships which result in child abuse and neglect can be prevented. See
Kempe, Assessing Family Pathology,CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: THE FAMILY AND THE COMMUNITY 120 (C.H. Kempe and R.E. Helfer eds. 1976); Steele, Violence Within the Family,
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: THE FAMILY AND THE COMMUNITY 13-15 (C.H. Kempe and R.E.
Helfer eds. 1976); See also articles collected in NATIONAL CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, ISSUES ON INNOVATION AND IMPLEMENTATION 225 (1978).

The most effective way Illinois can foster such a preventive approach would be through

state funding of community-based prevention projects. Although IDCFS does currently fund
some local programs on child abuse, neither the amount of funding ($1 million in 1978 and
1979) nor the fact that IDCFS manages such funding is sufficient to provide adequate prevention services. See ILLINOIS DEPT. OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, 1980 PLAN, PHASE I
1978-80, HUMAN SERVICES DATA REPORT (1979) at 63, 90, for an outline of the current
IDCFS program.
Instead of the current approach, legislation could establish a trust fund, similar to the
Federal Highway Trust Fund, which would consist of funds drawn annually from a specific
source, such as marriage license revenues. Such funds would be administered by a board

entirely distinct from IDCFS, and would be used solely for child abuse and neglect prevention projects. See MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 40-2-401-405 (1979). See R. HELFER, CHILD
ABUSE: A PLAN FOR PREVENTION (1978) for a more detailed description of such a program.
133.
134.

Fraser, A Pragmatic Alternative, supra note 21, at 123.
Id.

1980]

Child Abuse Legislation in Illinois

first four years of the nursery's existence, none3 5 of the children
cared for in the nursery was seriously reinjured.1
In creating Illinois nurseries, any connection with existing state
agencies should be kept to a minimum, since many potentially
abusive parents distrust government agencies because of previous
unpleasant contacts. Instead, a legislative enactment authorizing
specific funding to community groups which would establish and
maintain such centers seems to be a more pragmatic approach. All
nurseries would have to conform to certain requirements of staffing, confidentiality, and twenty-four hour operation.'
Home Health Visitors
Another method of curbing harm to children is utilization of the
home health visitor. Essentially, the visitor should be based on two
models: the English health visitor and the lay therapist. The English program involves a specially trained nurse who works with
families on both medical and social problems. 7 The lay therapist,
in contrast, is a non-professional who strives to help potentially, or
formerly, abusive parents through listening and support. 3 8 In England, health visitors have been especially effective in predicting
abuse in familes,' 3 9 while lay therapists have an excellent record of
preventing abuse. 4 0
A combination of the two models would result in a program that
would train persons in various medical and social skills such as nutrition, infant care, and simple communication skills. The training
would allow a home health visitor to work effectively with potentially abusive or neglectful parents by instructing them in the care
of their child. In addition, visitors would be available to provide
parents with empathetic support and understanding in times of

135. This program also involved lay therapists, a concept discussed in the text accompanying note 138 infra. See Fraser, A Pragmatic Alternative, supra note 21, at 123.
136. See other goals and guidelines in McQuiston, Crisis Nurseries, THE ABUSED CHILD
231-234 (Martin ed. 1976).
137. Dean, et al., Health Visitor's Role in Prediction of Early Childhood Injuries and
Failure to Thrive, 2 CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 1 (1978). "A Health Visitor in the United
Kingdom National Health Service is a nurse with special post-registration qualifications
who provides a continuing service to families in their homes, giving information aimed at
promoting good health, identifying medical and social needs and mobilizing appropriate resources when needed.".Id.
138. Fraser, A Pragmatic Alternative, supra note 21, at 122.
139. Dean et al., supra note 137.
140. Gray, Cutler, Dean and Kempe, Prediction and Prevention of Child Abuse and
Neglect, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: ISSUES ON INNOVATION AND IMPLEMENTATION 246 (1978).
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crisis. Such visitors, participating either on a voluntary or paid basis, should be supervised by professional nurses. As with the nursery program, the state could legislatively establish guidelines for
funding of community-based programs. These guidelines should
include qualifications for supervisory personnel, training, and interaction with other agencies.14 '
Parent-Infant Bonding
The final suggestion for prevention, a prenatal care and parentinfant bonding program, is one which logically should occur before
all others. 14 2 The prenatal program consists of training for the
pregnancy, labor, delivery and immediate peri-natal (after birth)
period. Furthermore, the program should inform prospective parents of the proper care for the child after leaving the hospital and
returning to the parental home. Because of the foreseeable
financial constraints, such a program should be primarily aimed at
all first-time parents. Although home health visitors could provide
individual parents with much of the instruction, training with
other first-time parents at a local center ' 3 or hospital is preferable.
The support generated by training with other first-time parents is
a major advantage of the group approach.'4 The parent-infant
bonding program would essentially ensure physical and emotional
45
interaction between parents and child."
CONCLUSION

The recommendations provided here are designed to ensure that
141.

Id.

142.

See R.

HELFER, CHILD ABUSE:

A

PLAN FOR PREVENTION

(1978) for an extensive out-

line of such a program.
143. The crisis nursery is one such possible place.
144. Id. While current natural childbirth programs accomplish much of what is outlined
above, state funding of parent-infant bonding programs should bring such programs to a
wider base of people.
145. R. HELFER, supra note 142, at 19-20, suggests that the following elements are essential in such a program: (1) That the mother's husband or partner would be with her
throughout the delivery. (2) A minimum of drugs would be used so that the mother is as
concious as feasible during delivery. (3) Immediately following delivery, the parents must
physically interact with the baby by touching, looking, holding and talking with him or her
for the first hour of the newborn's life.
Once the parents are home, home health visitors and community meetings with other new
parents could provide both education and support. A study described in G. EGAN & M.
COWAN, PEOPLE IN SYSTEMS: A MODEL FOR DEVELOPMENT IN THE HUMAN-SERVICE PROFESSIONS AND EDUCATION

84-85 (1979), showed that a parent-infant bonding program produced

mothers who were more solicitous about the welfare of their children. See also R. HELPER,
supra note 142, at 18.
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the rights of parents and children are protected, to protect children who have been abused, and, most importantly, to prevent
abuse and neglect. Certainly, all three aspects are necessary. Child
protection without respect for parental rights could result in a
gross overextension of a state's parens patriae powers, as well as
potential due process violations. Further, without attempts at prevention, those who work with abused and neglected children are
only involved with the incessant cycle of trying to save abused and
neglected children downstream. The frustrations of dealing only
with the effects of abuse and neglect might cause many to walk
away from the problems.
The economic and social costs of child abuse and neglect are
only beginning to be understood. One thing is clear, though: only a
program which deals with all aspects of abuse and neglect can hope
to avoid the repeating cycle of abused children becoming abusing
parents. The programs and legislative modifications outlined in
this article are a beginning step in breaking the pattern of abuse.
RICHARD T. COZZOLA

